

Traditional Market Existence, Retribution Governance, and Trader Welfare: Evidence from Indonesia

Muhamad Juaini^{1*} , Agus Riswanto² 

^{1,2}Economic Education, Faculty of Social and Economics, Universitas Hamzanwadi, Indonesia

*Corresponding author: muhamadjuaini3@gmail.com

Article History

Received: 30-05-2025

Revised: 16-06-2025

Published: 09- 07-2026

Key Words:

Traditional Market; Market

Retribution; Trader Welfare; Local

Economic Governance; Indonesia

Abstract: Traditional markets are vital socio-economic infrastructures for small traders in developing economies, but their contribution to welfare depends on governance quality rather than physical presence alone. Drawing on institutional governance and service reciprocity perspectives, this study examines how traditional market existence and market retribution governance influence trader welfare at Montong Beter Market, East Lombok Regency, Indonesia. A quantitative explanatory survey was conducted among 78 permanent traders selected through simple random sampling from a population of 366 traders. Data were collected using a structured questionnaire and analyzed through descriptive statistics, classical assumption testing, and multiple linear regression. The model was significant, $F(2, 75) = 38.877$, $p < .001$, explaining 50.9% of the variance in trader welfare (adjusted $R^2 = .496$). Market retribution governance had a positive and significant effect on trader welfare ($B = .670$, $\beta = .616$, $t = 6.393$, $p < .001$), whereas traditional market existence showed a positive but non-significant effect ($B = .170$, $\beta = .157$, $t = 1.629$, $p = .107$). These findings indicate that the physical continuity of a traditional market does not automatically improve trader welfare when services, infrastructure, and accountability remain weak. Instead, welfare is more strongly associated with transparent, fair, predictable, and service-oriented retribution governance. The study contributes to market-governance literature by reframing market retribution as a reciprocal governance mechanism rather than a fiscal extraction instrument. It offers policy implications for enhancing trader welfare through transparent fee collection, visible reinvestment, sanitation improvement, spatial order, and participatory market management.

How to Cite: Juaini, M., & Riswanto, A. (2026). Traditional Market Existence, Retribution Governance, and Trader Welfare: Evidence from Indonesia. *JMET: Journal of Management Entrepreneurship and Tourism*, 4(2), 82–91. <https://doi.org/10.61277/jmet.v4i2.201>

 <https://doi.org/10.61277/jmet.v4i2.201>

This is an open-access article under the [CC-BY-SA License](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/).



1. Introduction

Traditional markets remain a critical component of inclusive local economies in many low- and middle-income countries because they provide affordable goods, low-barrier entry for micro and small traders, flexible pricing mechanisms, and everyday employment for households that are not fully absorbed by formal retail systems. Rather than functioning only as physical trading sites, traditional markets operate as socio-economic institutions that connect producers, small-scale suppliers, traders, consumers, and local governments within a localized exchange system. Evidence from Indonesia shows that traditional food traders continue to play an important role despite competition from supermarkets, particularly because many consumers still rely on traditional markets for accessibility, affordability, and social familiarity (Suryadarma et al., 2010). Similar evidence from the broader food-systems literature shows that open-air and traditional markets remain

JMET Vol. 4, No.2 (July 2026)

important for food access, livelihoods, and urban-rural linkages even in contexts undergoing rapid retail modernization (Hannah et al., 2022; Reardon & Timmer, 2012; Reardon et al., 2019).

The persistence of traditional markets, however, should not be interpreted as automatic resilience. Recent studies emphasize that the capacity of traditional markets to support livelihoods and welfare depends strongly on market governance, institutional arrangements, infrastructure quality, sanitation, spatial organization, safety, and the responsiveness of local authorities (Davies et al., 2022; Cook et al., 2024). In this sense, a market can be socially and economically important while simultaneously being vulnerable to declining consumer visits, poor environmental conditions, congestion, and weak service delivery. Traditional markets therefore need to be understood as hybrid public-economic spaces: they are commercial arenas, but they also require public governance because their performance is shaped by regulations, facilities, fee systems, market order, and collective management practices.

In Indonesia, traditional markets are formally recognized as important instruments of distribution, local economic development, and community welfare. Policy frameworks such as Presidential Regulation No. 112 of 2007, Law No. 7 of 2014 on Trade, and ministerial regulations on market development position people's markets as strategic local economic institutions that require protection, arrangement, and empowerment. Nevertheless, Indonesian traditional markets increasingly face pressure from modern retail, digital commerce, changing consumer preferences, and demands for cleaner and more comfortable shopping environments. Wibawa et al. (2024) argue that preserving Indonesian traditional markets requires a new public governance perspective that emphasizes participation, collaboration, and local wisdom, rather than purely administrative control. This perspective is important because the welfare of traders depends not only on the existence of market buildings but also on the quality of governance that structures everyday market operations.

One central but under-theorized element of traditional market governance is market retribution. In local government practice, market retribution refers to fees paid by traders for the use of stalls, kiosks, yards, and other market services. In many studies, retribution is treated mainly as a source of local own-source revenue. This fiscal view is too narrow. From an institutional governance perspective, retribution should be understood as a service-based governance mechanism: traders pay fees with the expectation that local authorities provide clean facilities, security, order, waste management, drainage, lighting, accessibility, and other services that improve the trading environment. Institutional theory suggests that rules and charges become legitimate when they are predictable, transparent, and perceived as beneficial by the actors subject to them (North, 1990). Therefore, market retribution is likely to improve trader welfare only when it is governed fairly and reinvested visibly into market services.

Montong Beter Market in Sakra Barat District, East Lombok Regency, Indonesia, provides a relevant empirical setting for examining this issue. The market supports local trade and the circulation of agricultural products, yet it also faces practical challenges related to cleanliness, congestion, limited comfort, and uncertainty among traders regarding selling spaces and retribution practices. Data from the East Lombok Regency Trade Office show that the achievement of market retribution targets at Montong Beter Market fluctuated sharply between 2019 and 2023. While realization reached 96.03% in 2019 and exceeded the target in 2020 (107.61%), it declined to 66.70% in 2021, 66.51% in 2022, and only 33.76% in 2023. This declining achievement suggests that the problem is not merely revenue collection, but also the possible mismatch between fiscal targets, trader capacity, market conditions, and the perceived quality of services returned to traders.

Previous research has examined traditional markets from several perspectives, including competition with supermarkets (Suryadarma et al., 2010), food-system transformation (Reardon & Timmer, 2012; Reardon et al., 2019), the persistence of open-air markets in urban food systems (Hannah et al., 2022), market governance and rural-urban food linkages (Davies et al., 2022), and Indonesian traditional market preservation through new public governance (Wibawa et al., 2024). However, empirical studies that jointly examine traditional market existence and market retribution governance as determinants of trader welfare remain limited, particularly at the micro level of district markets outside major metropolitan areas. This gap is important

JMET Vol. 4, No.2 (July 2026)

because trader welfare is shaped by everyday governance practices, not only by broad retail transformation or national policy frameworks.

Based on this gap, the present study aims to analyze the effects of traditional market existence and market retribution governance on trader welfare at Montong Beter Market. This study offers three contributions. First, it reframes market retribution from a mere fiscal instrument into a governance variable that reflects transparency, fairness, affordability, predictability, and service reciprocity. Second, it provides micro-level empirical evidence from a district-level Indonesian traditional market, a setting that remains underrepresented in international market-governance literature. Third, it offers policy-relevant insights for local governments by showing whether trader welfare is more strongly associated with the physical existence of the market or with the governance quality of retribution and services.

2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development

2.1 Traditional Market Existence and Trader Welfare

Traditional market existence refers to the perceived viability, accessibility, continuity, and attractiveness of a market as a trading space. It includes the availability of trading facilities, the intensity of transactions, consumer accessibility, physical comfort, and the extent to which the market remains socially and economically embedded in the community. Markets that are accessible, active, and well-recognized by the community are more likely to support trader income and business continuity. From a welfare perspective, traders benefit when market existence generates stable customer flows, reduces transaction costs, and improves opportunities to sell goods regularly.

However, market existence alone may be insufficient to generate welfare improvements if the market suffers from weak infrastructure, poor cleanliness, congestion, or declining consumer confidence. The food system literature shows that traditional markets can be important for livelihoods and access to affordable food, but their performance depends heavily on governance capacity and institutional arrangements (Davies et al., 2022; Cook et al., 2024). Therefore, the expected positive relationship between market existence and trader welfare needs empirical testing.

H1: Traditional market existence has a positive effect on trader welfare.

2.2 Market Retribution Governance and Trader Welfare

Market retribution refers to local government fees imposed on traders for the use of market services and facilities, including kiosks, stalls, yards, and other public trading spaces. In a governance perspective, market retribution should be assessed not only by the amount collected, but also by its transparency, fairness, affordability, predictability, and reciprocity. Reciprocity means that the fees paid by traders are translated into visible improvements in sanitation, security, infrastructure, order, and market services.

Institutional theory suggests that public charges are more likely to gain legitimacy when rules are predictable and when users perceive that fees correspond to meaningful services (North, 1990). In the context of traditional markets, retribution governance can improve welfare when it supports a better trading environment, attracts buyers, reduces uncertainty, and increases trader trust in local government. However, retribution may have adverse effects if collection is not transparent or if traders do not experience service improvements. Therefore, the direction and magnitude of the relationship between retribution governance and welfare must be assessed empirically.

H2: Market retribution governance has a positive effect on trader welfare.

2.3 Joint Effect of Market Existence and Retribution Governance

Market existence and retribution governance are expected to jointly influence trader welfare because they represent two complementary dimensions of local market performance. Market existence captures the functional and socio-economic role of the market, whereas retribution governance captures how public fees and services are managed. A market may exist physically, but without effective governance it may fail to generate sustainable welfare. Conversely, retribution governance requires an active market ecosystem in which

service improvements can produce economic benefits. Therefore, this study also tests the simultaneous effect of both predictors on trader welfare.

H3: Traditional market existence and market retribution governance simultaneously affect trader welfare.

3. Methodology

3.1 Research Design and Site

This study used a quantitative explanatory survey design to examine the relationship between traditional market existence, market retribution governance, and trader welfare. The survey design was selected because the study aimed to measure trader perceptions and test predictive relationships among variables using statistical analysis. The research was conducted at Montong Beter Market, Sakra Barat District, East Lombok Regency, Indonesia. The market was selected because it represents a district-level traditional market that plays an important role in local trade while facing issues of infrastructure, cleanliness, congestion, and retribution target achievement.

3.2 Population, Sample, and Sampling Technique

The population consisted of 366 permanent traders operating at Montong Beter Market. The sample size was determined using the Slovin formula with a 10% margin of error, resulting in 78 respondents. Respondents were selected through simple random sampling to provide each permanent trader with an equal opportunity to be included in the study. Although this sampling approach is appropriate for an exploratory market-level survey, the 10% margin of error should be acknowledged as a limitation for generalization beyond the study site.

3.3 Variables and Measurement

The study used three main variables. Traditional market existence (X1) was conceptualized as traders' perception of the market's operational continuity, accessibility, trading attractiveness, consumer visits, infrastructure, order, and comfort. Market retribution governance (X2) referred to traders' perception of the transparency, affordability, regularity, fairness, and service reciprocity of market fee collection. Trader welfare (Y) represented perceived improvements in income stability, ability to meet household needs, business continuity, capital accumulation, and economic security. All items were measured using a structured questionnaire with Likert-type response options. Higher scores indicated stronger perceptions of each construct.

3.4 Data Analysis

Data were analyzed using descriptive statistics and multiple linear regression. Prior to regression analysis, classical assumption tests were conducted, including normality, multicollinearity, and heteroscedasticity tests. Normality was evaluated using the normal P-P plot of standardized residuals. Multicollinearity was assessed using tolerance and variance inflation factor (VIF), with tolerance values above .10 and VIF values below 10 indicating no serious multicollinearity. Heteroscedasticity was assessed using Spearman's rho test. The regression model was specified as follows:

$$Y = \alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \varepsilon$$

where Y represents trader welfare, X₁ represents traditional market existence, X₂ represents market retribution governance, α is the constant, β₁ and β₂ are regression coefficients, and ε is the error term. Statistical significance was evaluated at the 5% level. Because the heteroscedasticity test indicated a significant result for one predictor, the interpretation of inferential results should be treated cautiously, and future studies are encouraged to apply heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.

4. Results And Discussion

4.1 Market Retribution Target and Realization

Table 1 presents the target and realization of market service retribution at Montong Beter Market from 2019 to 2023. The data show that realization exceeded the target in 2020, but declined substantially relative to

the target from 2021 to 2023. The sharp decline in target achievement in 2023 indicates a need to strengthen retribution governance, trader compliance, market services, and revenue-management transparency.

Table 1. Target and Realization of Market Service Retribution at Montong Beter Market, 2019-2023

Year	Target (IDR)	Realization (IDR)	Achievement (%)
2019	250,000,000	240,073,151	96.03
2020	190,400,000	204,881,170	107.61
2021	385,000,000	256,803,000	66.70
2022	385,000,000	256,059,000	66.51
2023	770,000,000	259,979,000	33.76

Note. Values are reported in Indonesian rupiah (IDR). Achievement (%) was calculated as realization divided by target multiplied by 100. Source: East Lombok Regency Trade Office; processed by the authors.

4.2 Classical Assumption Tests

The normal P–P plot indicated that the standardized residuals were distributed close to the diagonal line, suggesting that the normality assumption was reasonably satisfied. The multicollinearity test showed tolerance values of .705 and VIF values of 1.418 for both independent variables, indicating that multicollinearity was not a concern. The heteroscedasticity test showed that market existence did not indicate heteroscedasticity ($p = .657$), whereas market retribution governance showed a significant heteroscedasticity result ($p = .018$).

Table 2. Diagnostic Tests for Regression Assumptions

Variable	Tolerance	VIF	Spearman Sig.	Conclusion
Market existence (X1)	.705	1.418	.657	No multicollinearity; no heteroscedasticity indicated
Market retribution governance (X2)	.705	1.418	.018	No multicollinearity; heteroscedasticity indicated

Note. VIF = variance inflation factor. Tolerance values above .10 and VIF values below 10 indicate no serious multicollinearity. Spearman significance values below .05 indicate heteroscedasticity.

4.3 Multiple Linear Regression

The multiple linear regression results are presented in Table 3. The regression coefficient for market existence is positive ($B = .170$), but the effect is not statistically significant at the 5% level ($p = .107$). This indicates that market existence tends to be associated with higher trader welfare, but the evidence is insufficient to confirm a significant independent effect after controlling for market retribution governance. Market retribution governance has a positive and statistically significant effect on trader welfare ($B = .670$, $p < .001$), indicating that better retribution governance is associated with higher trader welfare.

Table 3. Multiple Linear Regression Results for the Effects of Market Existence and Retribution Governance on Trader Welfare

Predictor	B	Std. Error	β	t	p-value	Decision
Constant	7.340	4.519	-	1.624	.108	-
Market existence (X1)	.170	.104	.157	1.629	.107	Not significant
Market retribution governance (X2)	.670	.105	.616	6.393	< .001	Significant

Note. Dependent variable: trader welfare. B = unstandardized coefficient; β = standardized coefficient.

Statistical significance was evaluated at $p < .05$.

The estimated regression equation is:

$$\text{Trader Welfare} = 7.340 + 0.170(\text{Market Existence}) + 0.670(\text{Market Retribution Governance})$$

4.4 Model Fit and Simultaneous Effect

The ANOVA results show that the model is statistically significant, $F(2, 75) = 38.877$, $p < .001$. This means that market existence and market retribution governance jointly explain significant variance in trader welfare. The model explains 50.9% of the variance in trader welfare ($R^2 = .509$), with an adjusted R^2 of .496. This indicates a moderate-to-strong explanatory capacity for a market-level survey model.

Table 4. Model Fit and Simultaneous Effect of Market Existence and Retribution Governance on Trader Welfare

Model statistic	Value
F-statistic	38.877
df	2, 75
p-value	< .001
R^2	.509
Adjusted R^2	.496
Std. error of estimate	2.26097

Note. The F-test assesses the simultaneous effect of the two predictors on trader welfare. R^2 indicates explained variance, while adjusted R^2 corrects for model complexity and sample size.

5. Discussion

This study investigated whether traditional market existence and market retribution governance contribute to trader welfare at Montong Beter Market. The empirical results show that the two predictors jointly explain a substantial proportion of variance in trader welfare, as indicated by a significant regression model, $F(2, 75) = 38.877$, $p < .001$, with $R^2 = .509$ and adjusted $R^2 = .496$. However, the individual effects reveal an important distinction: market retribution governance has a positive and statistically significant effect on trader welfare ($B = .670$, $\beta = .616$, $p < .001$), whereas traditional market existence has a positive but statistically non-significant effect ($B = .170$, $\beta = .157$, $p = .107$). This finding suggests that trader welfare is shaped less by the mere physical presence of the market and more by how the market is governed, financed, serviced, and maintained.

The positive but non-significant effect of market existence provides an important analytical insight. A traditional market may remain active, accessible, and socially recognized, but these characteristics do not automatically translate into measurable welfare improvement if traders continue to face poor sanitation, congestion, limited comfort, inadequate infrastructure, weak security, and uncertain trading arrangements. This result is consistent with the broader literature showing that open-air and traditional markets persist because of affordability and proximity, but their contribution to livelihoods depends on the quality of market infrastructure and planning (Hannah et al., 2022; Zhao et al., 2025). In other words, existence is a necessary but insufficient condition for welfare. The market must be transformed from a simple transaction space into a capability-enhancing environment where traders can operate productively, safely, and predictably.

The non-significant effect also helps refine the theoretical understanding of traditional market resilience. The resilience of traditional markets should not be measured only by whether the market continues to operate, but by whether it can sustain trader income, attract consumers, maintain orderly transactions, and adapt to changing retail competition. Reardon and Timmer (2012) and Reardon et al. (2019) show that developing-country food systems are undergoing rapid transformation through modernization of retail, processing, logistics, and procurement systems. Under these conditions, traditional markets cannot rely solely on historical presence or cultural familiarity. They need improvements in cleanliness, layout, accessibility, product quality, and service management in order to remain competitive with supermarkets, convenience stores, and digital platforms. Thus, the finding that market existence is not significant is theoretically plausible because existence without quality governance may generate limited welfare effects.

By contrast, the significant effect of market retribution governance demonstrates that fee management is central to trader welfare. This finding supports the institutional governance argument that public charges become more acceptable and welfare-enhancing when they are transparent, predictable, fair, and accompanied by visible service improvements (North, 1990). In the context of Montong Beter Market, retribution governance may influence welfare through several mechanisms. First, transparent and affordable fees reduce uncertainty and prevent traders from perceiving retribution as an arbitrary burden. Second, clear receipts and accountability strengthen trust between traders and market managers. Third, reinvestment of retribution revenue into sanitation, drainage, stall maintenance, lighting, security, and traffic control can increase consumer comfort and trader turnover. Fourth, participatory decision-making can increase compliance because traders are more likely to support fees when they understand how the revenue is used.

This result is also aligned with the new public governance perspective on Indonesian traditional markets. Wibawa et al. (2024) emphasize that traditional markets are more likely to survive when governance involves collaboration among government, traders, and local communities. Similarly, Davies et al. (2022) argue that traditional markets require appropriate institutional arrangements because their effectiveness in food systems depends on governance structures at the market level. The present study extends these arguments by providing quantitative evidence that governance is not only relevant for market preservation but also directly associated with trader welfare. Market retribution should therefore be understood as a reciprocal governance instrument rather than a one-way fiscal extraction mechanism.

The retribution realization data strengthen this interpretation. Target achievement at Montong Beter Market declined from 107.61% in 2020 to 33.76% in 2023, even though the nominal target increased substantially. This pattern may indicate a mismatch between fiscal expectations and the real capacity of the market. When targets increase without equivalent improvements in market facilities, buyer traffic, trader income, and service legitimacy, retribution policy may become difficult to implement and may weaken trader compliance. Therefore, retribution targets should be established based on realistic market diagnostics, including trader ability to pay, market occupancy, transaction intensity, infrastructure condition, and consumer visits. A fiscal target that is not supported by service improvement risks undermining both revenue performance and trader trust.

The findings have important implications for local market policy. First, local governments should publish clear retribution tariffs, provide official receipts, and communicate how market fees are allocated. Second, a fixed proportion of retribution revenue should be visibly reinvested in facilities that directly affect trader welfare, especially sanitation, waste management, drainage, stall repair, lighting, security, and congestion control. Third, trader associations should be involved in planning and monitoring market services to ensure that governance decisions reflect actual trader needs. Fourth, market revitalization should not focus only on physical renovation, but also on operational governance, service standards, accountability, and consumer attraction. These recommendations are consistent with studies emphasizing that traditional markets remain important for vulnerable populations and local food access when supported by inclusive governance and adequate infrastructure (Cook et al., 2024; Davies et al., 2022; Zhao et al., 2025).

Finally, the explanatory power of the model indicates that traditional market existence and retribution governance are important but not exhaustive determinants of trader welfare. Approximately half of the variance in trader welfare remains explained by factors outside the model, such as business capital, commodity type, daily turnover, trader experience, household dependency, competition intensity, digital marketing capacity, price volatility, and broader local economic conditions. Future studies should therefore expand the model by including these variables and by applying robust estimation techniques, especially because the heteroscedasticity test indicated a significant result for the retribution variable. Multi-market and longitudinal research designs would also provide stronger evidence on how market governance reforms affect trader welfare over time.

6. Conclusion

This study concludes that market retribution governance has a positive and significant effect on trader welfare at Montong Beter Market, while traditional market existence has a positive but non-significant effect when analyzed together with retribution governance. The two variables jointly have a significant influence on trader welfare and explain 50.9% of its variance. These findings indicate that trader welfare is shaped more strongly by the quality of fee governance and service reciprocity than by the physical existence of the market alone.

The study provides practical implications for local government and market managers. Market retribution should be managed transparently, fairly, and in direct connection with service improvements. Traditional market development should focus on infrastructure quality, cleanliness, congestion management, security, buyer attraction, and trader participation. These actions can strengthen trader trust, improve market competitiveness, and enhance the welfare function of traditional markets.

The study has limitations. It used a cross-sectional design, a single market setting, and a sample determined with a 10% margin of error. In addition, heteroscedasticity was detected for the retribution variable, suggesting the need for robust estimation in future research. Future studies should use larger samples across multiple markets, apply longitudinal or mixed-method designs, and include additional predictors such as capital, daily turnover, trader capability, digital adoption, market revitalization, and local policy support.

Recommendation

Based on the empirical findings, local governments and market managers should strengthen traditional market governance by transforming retribution from a purely revenue-oriented mechanism into a service-oriented instrument for improving trader welfare. First, retribution tariffs should be communicated transparently through published tariff boards, official receipts, and periodic public reports on revenue use. Second, retribution revenue should be visibly reinvested in facilities that directly affect traders' daily business activities, including sanitation, drainage, stall maintenance, lighting, parking arrangements, congestion control, and security. Third, trader forums should be institutionalized to involve market actors in planning, monitoring, and evaluating market services. Fourth, retribution targets should be determined based on realistic market diagnostics, trader capacity, consumer traffic, facility conditions, and local economic trends. Finally, market promotion, accessibility, and spatial organization should be improved to increase consumer visits, strengthen trader turnover, and enhance the long-term competitiveness of traditional markets.

Data Availability

The data that support the findings of this study are not publicly available because they contain information obtained from individual traders and local market-related administrative records. However, anonymized data may be made available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request, subject to ethical considerations, confidentiality requirements, and permission from the relevant institution.

Declaration of the Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI)

The authors declare that artificial intelligence-assisted tools were used only to support language refinement, grammar improvement, academic style enhancement, and manuscript organization. The authors reviewed, verified, and edited all AI-assisted outputs. No artificial intelligence tool was used to generate research data, manipulate statistical results, replace authorial judgment, or determine the study's findings and conclusions. The authors take full responsibility for the accuracy, integrity, and originality of the manuscript.

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Acknowledgment

The authors would like to express their sincere gratitude to the Economic Education Study Program, Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences, Universitas Hamzanwadi, for academic support during the preparation of this study. The authors also thank the East Lombok Regency Trade Office, the management of Montong Beter Market, and all participating traders for their assistance, information, and willingness to support the data collection process.

References

- Cook, B., Trevenen-Jones, A., & Sivasubramanian, B. (2024). Nutritional, economic, social, and governance implications of traditional food markets for vulnerable populations in sub-Saharan Africa: A systematic narrative review. *Frontiers in Sustainable Food Systems*, 8, 1382383. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fsufs.2024.1382383>
- Davies, J., Blekking, J., Hannah, C., Zimmer, A., Joshi, N., Anderson, P., Chilenga, A., & Evans, T. (2022). Governance of traditional markets and rural-urban food systems in sub-Saharan Africa. *Habitat International*, 127, 102620. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2022.102620>
- Deininger, K., Jin, S., & Ma, M. (2022). Structural transformation of the agricultural sector in low- and middle-income economies. *Annual Review of Resource Economics*, 14, 221-241. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-resource-111820-033252>
- Field, A. (2018). *Discovering statistics using IBM SPSS statistics* (5th ed.). SAGE Publications.
- Hair, J. F., Black, W. C., Babin, B. J., & Anderson, R. E. (2019). *Multivariate data analysis* (8th ed.). Cengage Learning.
- Hannah, C., Davies, J., Green, R., Zimmer, A., Anderson, P., Battersby, J., Baylis, K., Joshi, N., & Evans, T. P. (2022). Persistence of open-air markets in the food systems of Africa's secondary cities. *Cities*, 124, 103608. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2022.103608>
- North, D. C. (1990). *Institutions, institutional change and economic performance*. Cambridge University Press.
- Presidential Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia Number 112 of 2007 concerning the Arrangement and Development of Traditional Markets, Shopping Centers, and Modern Stores.
- Reardon, T., & Timmer, C. P. (2012). The economics of the food system revolution. *Annual Review of Resource Economics*, 4, 225-264. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.resource.050708.144147>
- Reardon, T., Echeverria, R., Berdegue, J., Minten, B., Liverpool-Tasie, S., Tschirley, D., & Zilberman, D. (2019). Rapid transformation of food systems in developing regions: Highlighting the role of agricultural research and innovations. *Agricultural Systems*, 172, 47-59. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.agsy.2018.01.022>
- Republic of Indonesia. (2009). Law Number 28 of 2009 concerning Regional Taxes and Regional Retributions.
- Republic of Indonesia. (2014). Law Number 7 of 2014 concerning Trade.
- Regulation of the Minister of Trade of the Republic of Indonesia Number 70/M-DAG/PER/12/2013 concerning Guidelines for the Arrangement and Development of Traditional Markets, Shopping Centers, and Modern Stores.
- Sen, A. (1999). *Development as freedom*. Oxford University Press.
- Suryadarma, D., Poesoro, A., Akhmadi, Budiyati, S., Rosfadhila, M., & Suryahadi, A. (2010). Traditional food traders in developing countries and competition from supermarkets: Evidence from Indonesia. *Food Policy*, 35(1), 79-86. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2009.11.002>
- Wibawa, S., Firdaus, R. S. M., Indroyono, P., Dumairy, & Savitri, L. A. (2024). Preserving traditional market in Indonesia based on the new public governance perspective. *International Journal of Asian Business and Information Management*, 15(1), 1-14. <https://doi.org/10.4018/IJABIM.349223>
- Wooldridge, J. M. (2020). *Introductory econometrics: A modern approach* (7th ed.). Cengage Learning.
- Zhao, L., Timpe, A., & Lohrberg, F. (2025). Informal food systems in food security planning: A case study of Nanjing, China. *Food Security*, 17, 1453-1471. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12571-025-01593-x>



Zhong, S., Chen, Y., & Zeng, G. (2022). Multiple problematisations: The logics governing wet markets in two Chinese cities. *Urban Studies*, 59(10), 2018-2035. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00420980211028115>